Civil Society, Religion and the State: Mapping of Borno and Adamawa

A Stakeholder Analysis
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'SUPPORT TO STRENGTHENING RESILIENCE IN NORTH-EAST NIGERIA'

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Abbreviations

ANPP	All Nigeria People's Party
APC	All Progressives Congress
API	Adamawa Peace Initiative
AUN	American University of Nigeria
CAN	Christian Association of Nigeria
CBO	Community-based organisation
ECWA	Evangelical Church Winning All
EYN	*Ekklisiyar Yan'uwa A Nigeria* Church of the Brethren in Nigeria
FBO	Faith-based organisation
FOMWAN	Federation of Muslim Women's Associations of Nigeria
IDP	Internally displaced person
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
JNI	*Jama'atu Nasril Islam* Society for the Support of Islam
LCCN	Lutheran Church of Christ in Nigeria
LGA	Local government area
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NIREC	Nigerian Inter-Religious Council
PDP	People's Democratic Party
PERL	Partnership to Engage, Reform and Learn
SDP	Social Democratic Party
TEKAN	*Tarayyar Ekklisiyar Kristi a Nigeria* Fellowship of Churches of Christ in Nigeria
VOA	Voice of America

Introduction

Background to the study

The north-east region is among the poorest in Nigeria and exhibits persistently poor socio-economic indicators. In 2009 a group known as Boko Haram (officially *Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād*) initiated a violent insurgency. Commonly cited figures put the deaths from the conflict at minimum 20,000. Eight years on, the insurgency and the military response has spurred a complex humanitarian emergency that spans four countries and affects up to 17 million people.

This report provides background and analysis on two affected states in the Northeast: Borno and Adamawa. Sitting in Nigeria's extreme Northeast corner, bordering Chad, Cameroon and Niger, Borno is the largest state by area and has a population of at least 4.2 million people (2006 census). Since 2009 it has been the epicentre of the conflict, with security concerns continuing to constrain free access to all the local government areas beyond the state capital[1].

Adamawa is smaller with an estimated population of 3.2 million. Neighbouring Borno state in the north, it runs down the mountainous border between Nigeria and Cameroon. Adamawa state is heterogeneous and ethnically diverse, with a considerably larger Christian population than Borno. The Boko Haram conflict has affected about 1/3 of the state, displacing people from 7 local government areas (LGAs) in the north of the state[2]. This report analyses those elements of Adamawa's social and political landscape that are most relevant to those LGAs that were directly affected by Boko Haram and thus the site of ongoing recovery efforts.

Methodology and ethics

This report draws on an initial desk-based literature review and 12 days of in-country field work including 14 interviews in Maiduguri in Borno State, nine in Yola and eleven Mubi in Adamawa State and three in Abuja. The interviews were semi-structured with some pre-set questions, but a flexible structure which allowed discussion to focus on areas raised by the participant. Respondents were drawn through purposive sampling from government, religion, civil society, business and trade and traditional rulers. Three focus groups allowed us to include respondents who did not hold positions of authority; one with young men from Maiduguri between 19-21 years, one with female internally displaced persons (IDPs) women living in Maiduguri and one with IDPs in a church-run camp in Yola. Interviews were conducted in the language of choice of the respondent: English, Hausa, Kanuri, or a combination of the three. Informed consent was obtained verbally from all respondents prior to the interview and their identities are kept confidential and anonymous. 75% of respondents were men (45) and 25% were women (15). In our sample the only government officials, traditional rulers and religious leaders we spoke to were men, which broadly reflects reality on the ground. The only women we spoke to were drawn from civil society, traders or IDPs. The research team was comprised of a mix of gender and ethnic and national backgrounds. A risk identified in advance was what INGO Forum describes from their 2016 mapping as

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[1] Lake Chad Basin: Crisis Overview. UN OCHA.11 August 2017.
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Lac%20Chad%20Snapshot_11%20Aug%202017.pdf
[2] "The Battle of the States," *Daily Trust*, April 5, 2015,
http://www.dailytrust.com.ng//sunday/index.php/top-stories/20190-the-battle-of-the-states.

"process fatigue". It was decided to replicate as little as possible the mapping already conducted in recent years.

Detailed information on the composition of the interviewees can be found in annexe 4.

1. Key Social and Political Actors

The key social and political actors in Borno and Adamawa can be divided into civil society, government, traditional rulers and religious actors. Together, this provides a broader understanding of the social and political landscape of the two states, reflecting diverse social groupings and numerous sources of power and authority. These broad categories have blurred boundaries and some actors will fit into more than one category. Indeed, it is the overlapping nature of different forms of authority that explains the way power in distributed in Borno and Adamawa society.

a. Civil Society

A broader conception of civil society: Pyramid model

Previous mappings have produced long lists of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community organisations and faith based groups that exist in both Adamawa and Borno states. This relied on standards and criteria developed in international corporate and NGO settings such as, professionalization of staff and familiarity with international ways of working[3], organisational and technical efficiency and codified internal institutions and systems[4], capacity to deliver services and achieve outputs[5]. Of course, these criteria reflect important concerns that partner organisations are honest and reliable but emphasise technocratic elements of organisation over the relational elements. By looking at civil society in broad terms - as all groupings that are outside the family, the state and the clergy – one can gain a fuller and more representative understanding of the social fabric in Borno and Adamawa. Our analysis includes terms and acronyms in current circulation among donors – CBOs (community-based organisations), NGOs, FBOs (faith-based organisation) etc. - but emphasises the fundamental differences between them and the ways donors can engage with them.

Civil society in the north-east can be sketched as a pyramid. As you move up the pyramid organisations are professionalised, visible to international actors and have ways of working that meet the technocratic and auditing requirements of large donor grants. As you move down the pyramid organisations tend to be less professionalised, more embedded in the everyday lives of members and beneficiaries and less easily legible to international donors. Moreover, the criteria used to evaluate organisations have a knock-on effect on the kinds of organisations made visible through the mapping. As such many previous donor mappings emphasise more urban and professionalised NGOs than smaller, grassroots community associations.[6]

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[3] i.e. written job descriptions, qualifications, experience managing donor grants, ability to use the vocabulary of international donors and institutions.

[4] i.e. written vision statement, narrow defined thematic focus, Board of trustees, financial management and auditing systems.

[5] i.e. number of beneficiaries, ability to engage in forms of quantitative monitoring and evaluation and measurement of impact in ways which correspond to internationally defined standards.

[6] The INGO Forum mapping noted that in Borno "virtually all the organisations assessed are urban based located within the metropolis of the capital city Maiduguri." So too, the Adamawa NGOs were "urban based".

Top tier: Urban-based Professionalised NGOs

These tend to be non-governmental organisations led by individuals who have experience working at a high-level internationally and have the capacity to manage large grants, and perform monitoring and evaluation. They have dedicated programme offices, informative websites and are adept at navigating the world of civil society vocabulary and modes of operation. They are also the smallest in number and reach.

INGO Forum concludes that the quality of internal institutional arrangements, such as financial auditing, personnel management and strategic planning, is very poor among local NGOs. A major challenge faced by local NGOs is in attracting and retaining highly skilled staff, with most organisations staffed by a small core staff and then volunteers and temporary staff brought in for specific projects. This may be as much a symptom of how international donors engage these NGOs as it is an indication of low capacity per se (including the 'poaching' of skilled staff by international NGOs). The vast majority of local NGOs were highly reliant on a narrow stream of ad hoc donor funding, which meant their financial base was unsustainable and insecure. In these conditions, long-term financial planning, and international standards of 'good organisational governance' more generally are difficult to maintain.

These NGOs vary considerably in terms of quality and commitment. Some are very good. They are able to combine the experience and international exposure of their leadership with a sustained commitment to the needs of local people following the crisis. Likeminds, run by Fatima Kyari, now has several years' experience delivering humanitarian aid using a network of local volunteers, mostly drawn from social networks of graduates and educated local elites. The Neem Foundation benefits from extensive experience of its founder in delivering donor programmes and expertise in psychological counselling services. These organizations would benefit from international support in financing and capacity building, but donors should be aware that the strengths of such organizations are a product of their privileged elite position. Donors would benefit from collaborative partnerships with this top tier of NGOs, respecting their experience and expertise, with realistic expectations about their more limited representativeness.

Other urban based NGOs suffer from the worst of both worlds. They lack both the professionalization that might enable them to handle large grants, and the local knowledge and legitimacy to connect with target beneficiaries. Some such NGOs are well-intentioned but struggle to survive in the, often convoluted, context of donor-dictated funding competitions. Others are scams exist only in name, but have no operations or staff, or are opportunist ventures set up by politicians to benefit from their political access.

Second-tier: state-level civic associations

The next layer includes state-level branches of national unions and associations. These tend to have established organisational structures, sometimes dating back decades, which spread across the whole of Nigeria. Often they have large middle class memberships, meaning those in formal sector employment, secondary and/or university education or the professions. These associations will operate according to Nigerian professional norms; for instance, with an elected executive and a full calendar of regular events, and a strong corporate identity. However, they may operate within paradigms that differ from the contemporary liberal template of civil society, reflecting instead norms of workers' groups, charities or self-help associations, and are less reliant on relationships with external donors. Key examples include the state branches of FOMWAN, the Federation of Muslim Women's Associations of

Nigeria, major unions like the National Union of Teachers, the Nigerian Union of Journalists and Academic Staff Union.

Third tier: Community based organisations

The third tier can be described as community based organisations. These may cover a whole local government area, a town or just a community within a single neighbourhood. They share some of the same organisational structures as second-tier groups, such as elected executives and regularly meetings, but have a more limited capacity for outward facing activities like advocacy. Instead their activities may focus on small scale welfare support for members or occasional representation to local government in dispute resolution. These groups include local branches of market associations such as fish sellers, tailors or provisions sellers. Youth groups with some internal organisational structure would fit into this group. Indeed, some youth groups have very large memberships and strong political connections, yet differ from more established second-tier groups because of the lower social status of their members, smaller reach and greater embeddedness in local political economies. Alternatively, they may be community self-help groups or neighbourhood associations. In the case of Mubi South local government area, the landscape of civil society reflected the agrarian nature of the surrounding region, with the Farmer's Association wielding the biggest membership.

Fourth tier: grassroots groupings

The final category comprises loose social groupings that may not even have formal names or any institutionalised structure, but nonetheless exist as regular and consistent social groups. These include very small scale women's associations and majalisas, where young men regularly gather in the same place for nightly socialising. These groups engage in ad-hoc welfare activities; either pooling money within themselves for big social occasions or emergency, organising to undertake volunteering in the local community, or engaging in piecemeal charity work like delivering food parcels to prisons. They may have connections with larger more institutionalised groups, either via formal routes, like membership of FOMWAN, or informally, say when politicians want to mobilise people for votes or support.

Strengths and weaknesses:

One potential caveat is that the pyramid model assumes that there exists a layer of indigenous civil society that - whilst widespread in other regions of the country – is largely absent in the northeast. For instance, based on the market leaders interviewed, associations meet less regularly than their counterparts in Western or Eastern Nigeria. Mubi Market Chamber of Commerce meets only a few times a year. Also, association membership appears less mandatory than elsewhere in Nigeria with some traders interviewed not being part of any groupings or associations.

Another major risk is of romanticising the lower tiers of civil society as apolitical and harmonious. This obscures a more complex reality that includes elements of inequality, social division and widespread mistrust. Grassroots groups are not immune from the social dynamics of society more generally, indeed they often reproduce them: they may be patriarchal, ethnically-exclusive or antagonistic. Given the hierarchical nature of both Borno and Adamawa there may be no institutions, whether state or non-state, that are truly representative of the most vulnerable in society.

Furthermore, donors should be mindful about not engaging selectively and instrumentally with civil society, cherry picking the sections which suit their aims and objectives. One reason

is that there is no guarantee that the agenda of civil society groups overlaps with that of donors. For instance, whilst many donor programmes seek to promote an idea of women's empowerment independently from their husbands, local women's groups may be devoted to conservative ideas of supporting women by counselling marital subservience. A second reason is that any donor intervention will have knock on effects for how actors in the social landscape interact, empowering some with resources and prestige and marginalising others. Given how short term many interventions are, donors should beware of seeing civil society as a 'pick and mix' to be instrumentalised without sensitivity to the longer term political consequences. There may be ways of building mutually beneficial links between different tiers. The Network of Civil Society in Borno is staffed by experienced civil society activists with international experience. They are already involved in liaising with smaller, less organised groups to deliver programmes and connect smaller groups to donor funding.

Press

Radio is the most important media in the North East, with popular stations including the BBC Hausa Service and VOA (Voice of America). In Nigeria, the vast majority of newspapers are based in the South, apart from Daily Trust, seen as a Northern newspaper, which is based in Abuja. This regional disparity has worsened due to Boko Haram, with many news organisations withdrawing their reporters due to security concerns. Some emerging media platforms are: Dandal Kura – a radio station, broadcasting in Kanuri, emphasising youth engagement and working across different media. Yerwa Express – an online newspaper with local reporters focusing on local issues and stories. It has some social media presence and intends to develop interactive chat platforms.

b. Government

Nigeria is a presidential federal system, with 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory. The president is elected via popular vote and has extensive formal and informal powers. The presidential system is mirrored at the state level with strong executive state governors, who enjoy the ability to control the state budget, appointments of commissioners to head civil service Ministries and appointments to a wide array of parastatals. Local Government and the legislative arm of government, the State Houses of Assembly, are frequently unable to act as a check on executive power.

State governments dominate their local economies, with huge potential for private gain for those in office at various levels. As such, elections are hotly contested. In most states in Nigeria, elections broadly reflect the will of the majority, though electoral competition draws on a range of illicit and illegal means of swaying voters, including patronage and violence. Moreover, states where the Governor is drawn from the same party as the President tend to enjoy substantial advantages in terms of access to federal resources.

Since 2007 Borno has not held Local Government Elections. The Governor appoints Caretaker Local Government Chairmen for six month terms, subject to approval by the State House of Assembly. This means that Caretaker Chairmen are dependent upon the Governor for their political survival. They have a very limited ability to contradict or challenge the State Government. Under caretaker arrangements there is an upper limit on the value of projects that the local government can sign off on, before it must be referred upward to the state Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs. This means that not only are the democratic procedures to electing local governments cut off, but their financial capacity to respond to popular requests from the local community is low. This should be borne in mind for donors seeking to work with and through local government.

The Boko Haram crisis has tilted the balance of power in further in favour of the state government because the majority of local governments were destroyed or forced to flee by Boko Haram. For several years many Local Government Caretaker Chairmen resided as IDPs in Maiduguri. Local government buildings, court houses and police stations were destroyed in places affected by Boko Haram, meaning that the state has no physical or personnel presence in many areas of Borno state. The allocation from the federal government to local governments is routed through the State Government joint account, and is under the control of the state government. With many areas still inaccessible, it is hard to know whether the state exists in any tangible form in the areas outside of Maiduguri. Donors know little about the capacity of various on-paper governance arrangements in the state, nor the patterns of engagement between state and non-state actors.

Local government elections were held in 20 of Adamawa's 21 LGAs over July and August 2016[7]. This means that the third tier of government retains some ability to act as a counter-weight to state government. It also means there is greater political autonomy in local government because the Chairmen, despite typically being protégés of the Governor, will have his own democratic legitimacy. However, elections were repeatedly delayed for a total of nine months in Michika due to security concerns. Local government elections were eventually held in Michika in March 2017 amid security concerns and tensions between supporters of the People's Democratic Party (PDP), the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the All Progressives Congress (APC).

The former President, Goodluck Jonathan, declared a state of emergency in Yobe, Borno and Adamawa in May 2013. This was an unpopular move in the North, where it was seen as a ploy to disrupt voting in states which were opposition strongholds.

Political Competition in Borno

Since democratisation in 1999 Borno has been an opposition state. The first democratic Governor, Mala Kachalla, came from the Alliance for Democracy, and in 2003 he was defeated by Senator Ali Modu Sheriff of the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP). Modu Sheriff's campaign was notable because it focused on implementing sharia law in the state. A number of irregularities and poor electoral practices characterised the elections from 1999-2007. In 2011 Modu Sheriff was succeeded by his protégé and former cabinet member, Kashim Shettima, also of ANPP. Shettima dominates the political landscape in Borno and enjoys a relatively high profile in the Federation.

The fallout from the 2014 Chibok kidnapping shaped the 2015 election campaigns, with Jonathan perceived as ever more ineffectual after his wife made veiled threats against those campaigning for action for the girls' release. The 2015 Presidential and Gubernatorial elections were a striking demonstration of Borno's animosity towards the Jonathan-led PDP government. Both were extreme landslides, with the APC candidates at both the state and national level winning 95% of the vote share.

A key element of Buhari's success was his commitment to a more robust military response. Respondents suggested that the political transition from PDP to APC at the national level contributed to a slight improvement in public trust in the military on the ground in Borno state.

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[7] "APC Sweeps Adamawa LG Election," *Vanguard News*, August 1, 2016, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/08/apc-sweeps-adamawa-lg-election/.

Buhari installed new military leadership, which was popularly regarded as more committed to bringing peace, and being better connected with Borno society.

Since 1999 armed youth groups have played a role in Borno's elections. The religious group that eventually morphed into Boko Haram originally started as a separatist religious community, led by a preacher called Mohammad Yusuf. Yusuf was arrested and killed in custody during an uprising of Boko Haram's members in July 2009. However, before the conflict, Yusuf and his followers were closely involved in campaigning for Ali Modu Sheriff in 2003.

After the 2007 election the group then lost confidence in Sheriff over perceived stalled implementation of sharia and continued to make accusations of corruption in government. They were dropped from the Governor's patronage and faced harassment from the state. There are ongoing concerns about the role of youth militias in Borno state politics and the example of Mohammad Yusuf shows the complex relationship between fringe youth militias and mainstream politicians.

Political Competition in Adamawa

State party politics in Adamawa is currently driven by competition between three main figures. The most influential are Atiku Abubakar and Michael Nyako. They are two rival godfathers; powerful individuals who can command political support for selected 'protégés' who are then loyal to them once in office. Whilst godfather politics has often been associated with violence and corruption, godfathers may draw on a range of different forms of authority including wealth, connections, political popularity, personal authority and religious status.

Atiku Abubakar is a wealthy politician from the state who served as Vice-President under Obasanjo. He has long been a giant on Nigerian national politics, first as a powerful figure in the PDP and then as part of the APC. Atiku intensely supported the founding of the American University of Nigeria in 2003 and is one of its primary benefactors. He also has numerous business interests in the state, such as Faro water and others. There are suggestions that Atiku may run for the presidency, should Buhari have to step down. However, some believe that his credibility in the North is low due to frequent changing alliances and 'floor-crossing'.

Former Naval Officer, Murtala Nyako, was Governor of Adamawa between 2007 and 2014. His time in office was chequered by a complex series of impeachments and legal controversies, during which time he was re-elected twice. In office, he built a network of loyal political followers. He has struggled to maintain his control over the state due to legal difficulties, with his impeachment starting a long sequence of corruption cases. He was popular for rolling out a network of skills training and empowerment schemes across the state. Whether Nyako will be able to reassert his primacy in the state is unclear: his son Adbul-Azeez Nyako serves as Senator for Adamawa Central, and may take over his father's legacy.

The third main figure is Nuhu Ribadu, a technocrat from an established Adamawa political family. He is a celebrated pioneer of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. He is a very well respected figure among foreign donors and is seen as a technocrat who stands apart from other politicians. Despite coming from a major political family in Adamawa, he does not have a high profile locally. In 2011 he was the Presidential candidate for the South-West based, 'good governance' Action Congress of Nigeria. He has set up a political group called 'Black Hat Movement' in an effort to build a local structure of supporters. Beyond these

three men, there are few rival bases of power. Whilst state governors who would normally use their time in office to build up resources and loyalty, the former governors in Adamawa were in power for very short periods and do not have personal political clout.

Adamawa has historically been a PDP state; however that has changed in recent years. Adamawa State PDP was part of the 2013-14 PDP Crisis, which eventually led to defections to the APC and set the course for an APC victory in 2015. Elections for President and Governor were held for all Adamawa LGAs in 2015. As the Adamawa State Independent Electoral Commission was unwilling to send staff into Michika and Madagali, elections for those two LGAs were held in designated IDP voting centres in Yola. In the Presidential election Buhari (APC) won 14 out of 21 LGAs, with 374,701 votes versus 251,664 for Jonathan (PDP).

The Gubernatorial election saw a strong win for the APC candidate Jibrilla Bindow, with 54% of the vote. In second place was Marcus Gundiri for SDP with 27%, the only Christian contender and represented the state's Christian population. In third, the PDP's Nuhu Ribadu won only 15% of the vote. His candidacy for the PDP was surprising due to his history in the opposition, but reflects the complex interactions between federal and state politics in Nigeria. Running on the PDP ticket although not directly successful in the short term, allowed him to reassert himself as a player of note in Adamawa state politics. Ribadu faced resistance from other members of the PDP for being parachuted in, reducing the PDP machine's willingness to deliver votes for him.

Therefore in 2015 APC both won the state, as well as becoming the party of government at the centre. This strengthened the APC in the state and connected them to resources and patronage controlled by the federal government. Subsequent elections for federal constituencies and local government chairman have gone almost unanimously to the APC, which is typical of the "winner takes all" politics in Nigeria. Both Ribadu and Gundiri have since been absorbed into the APC, meaning that all meaningful political competition occurs within the APC rather than between parties.

The current governor, Bindow, came to power as a protégé of Nyako before switching alliances to Atiku, who had greater resources at his disposal. This confers on Atiku control over key levers of power, dispensing appointments and patronage. However, the current dispensation is not immune to change. Should Bindow shift allegiances again, or should a protégé of Nyako be able to establish themselves as a viable candidate for Governor, the balance of power may shift. This would have implications for Atiku's access to resources and also for the political standing of the American University of Nigeria (AUN), which may be side-lined as too closely associated with Atiku should a new godfather become dominant.

c. Traditional Rulers

Traditional rulers are deeply involved in everyday life of communities and are gatekeepers. They are the primary channel through which communities are connected to government, through a structured hierarchy based on traditional units: the smallest being the ward, then the village, then the district. The system of traditional rulers in Borno and Adamawa is first ethnic and geographical, then religious. For example, the Shehu is in the first instance leader of the Kanuri people, which is then given geographical jurisdiction across specific LGAs. Kanuri leadership is situated within an understanding of political leadership as necessarily Islamic. This means that traditional leadership therefore combines ethnic, geographical and religious elements.

Kanuri terms used in Borno	English	Hausa terms used in Adamawa
Shehu	Supreme	Lamido
Mai	Emir	Amiru
Hakimi	District Head	Hakimi
Lawan	Village Head	Dakaci / Maiji Millar
Bulama	Ward Head	Mai Angwa

Table 1 Adapted from Blench et al 2006 pg. 43

Traditional Rulers in Local Governance

In terms of traditional rulers' role in governance, service provision or claim-making on government is secondary. Based on our interview, the primary role of traditional rulers are firstly to manage the flow of information. Intelligence is gathered by ward heads through constant presence within communities. It is expected that ward heads will personally know the various households in their area and any new entrants to the community will report to them. This intelligence is passed up through the hierarchy to the emir. Information also flows downwards when there is need for 'sensitisation' of the general public, for instance to be alert to security threats or to encourage participation in vaccination campaigns.

A second related role is to enforce social conformity and control. Traditional rulers should 'know' their communities; they are responsible for guaranteeing social regulation and order. Typically, traditional rulers will spend some time each day holding court outside their residence as part of their duties, during which they are accessible to their constituents. Examples from our interviews showed how traditional rulers identified and monitored local miscreants and criminals. This suggests that the flip-side of 'knowing the community' via direct social interaction is that traditional rulers are involved in the policing of 'unknown faces'.

A third major role is dispute resolution. Generally, this means that when conflict emerges relevant parties to the conflict will be invited to sit down with the traditional rulers who then arbitrates and decides on a negotiated solution. Traditional rulers maintain a significant role in mediate of local disputes and peace-building. The three major types of conflicts they deal with are inter-communal, conflicts over resources – often over grazing rights-, and marital conflict and sexual violence.

The Boko Haram insurgency in itself represents a loss of authority for traditional rulers, because Boko Haram was able to act as an alternative authority. Many traditional rulers were violently targeted in attacks or forced to flee to Maiduguri. Others are reported to have willingly collaborated, or in some cases community leaders were forced to take up leadership positions in the Boko Haram structure which imitated traditional systems.

More information concerning Borno's Shehu and Adamawa's Lamido can be found in annexe 1.

d. Religious Actors

Population, census and demographic data are of poor quality and highly contested in the North East. However, the religious geography of Borno and Adamawa can be understood

impressionistically as falling into three broad zones. The zone covering northern Borno is practically speaking entirely Muslim with few if any formal churches. The zone covering Maiduguri and central Borno is home to a Muslim majority but with a visible Christian minority, and a mixture of churches and mosques. The most southerly zone, covering areas like Chibok, Biu and Northern Adamawa is more mixed with Muslims and Christians approaching parity of numbers, and some communities which are majority Christian. This categorisation is necessarily simplistic, but captures the fact that southern areas of Borno may have more in common in terms of their social make-up with northern Adamawa than the rest of Borno.

Sufism is the biggest Muslim sect in both states, which is part of Sunni Islam. Major Sufi brotherhoods, or *turuks*, include the Tijjaniyya and Qadiriyya. Sufism typical preaches quiet non-political forms of Islam. Next largest is the Izala, a Salafi group which has a large social welfare programme and runs many Islamiyya schools. However, many in Borno and Adamawa identify simply as Muslims rather than a specific sect and instead follow individual sheikhs. Maiduguri is a centre of Islamic scholarship, attracting thousands of al-majirai: young boys who study under malams and beg for food.

Christianity was introduced to Borno and Adamawa by missionaries from Europe around the turn of the 20th century. The major denominations are described here in roughly size order, based on estimates from our respondents. The largest is protestant denominations which originated in missionary churches but developed into distinct Nigerian independent churches: Evangelical Church Winning All (ECWA), *Ekklisiyar Yan'uwa A Nigeria* (EYN, Church of the Brethren in Nigeria) and Lutheran Church of Christ in Nigeria (LCCN). Next in size is Catholic, with several major urban congregations and strong international links. Other traditional protestant denominations, specifically Baptists, have well established bases across the region. More recent but fast growing is Pentecostalism, with Pentecostal churches often targeting a younger and more middle-class audience.

A detailed description of the different denominations, churches and groups can be found in annexe 2.

Both Christians and Muslims have state branches of national umbrella organisations that are the primary representatives of the religion in the two states. The JNI (*Jama'atu Nasril Islam*, Society for the Support of Islam) represents the Islamic establishment and Muslim Councils bring Islamic groups together under the auspices of traditional rulers. The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) represents Christians divided into five blocks. There is a history of inter-religious interaction of various forms, with high-level inter-faith coalitions having been in operation for the last two decades. These include the Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC), set up by the government in 2000, the donor initiated Inter-Faith Mediation Council and the Adamawa Peace Initiative (API).

A detailed description of the umbrella organisations and the inter-faith groups can be found in annexe 3.

e. Overlapping Hierarchies: Government, Traditional Rulers and Religion

The formal government structures are intertwined with those of traditional authority, in ways that are generally mutually reinforcing but can act as a check on the power of both. Areas of overlap can be seen in first the process of appointment and second in funding and

organisation, and take the form of both formal and informal institutions. Politicians, foremost the governor, have influence over traditional rulers. The system of traditional authority is based on hereditary succession, however has significant space for contestation as any of a ruler's male heirs (typically understood as his sons and grandsons), are eligible for the throne. This flexibility creates opportunities for elected officials and other politicians to exercise influence over the traditional authority by backing one candidate over another. Officially, the Governor has the right to appoint the supreme traditional ruler as well as the ability to promote emirs within the hierarchy of 1st class and 2nd class rulers. The power of state officials to select friendly and cooperative traditional rulers strengthens the power of the formal state.

This is further reinforced by the arrangements for the funding and organisation of traditional rulers within and alongside government structures. The example of the District Office in Maiduguri is illustrative of the extreme degree of overlap between the two systems. The office serves to coordinate between District Heads in certain geographical area, making it part of the traditional system. Its staff are formally appointed by and on the payroll of the state government, but they are selected by traditional rulers. The District Office coordinates the collection of specific low-level business taxes through government tax-collectors, which it then remits to the government. This shows the complex transfusions of funding, personnel and, mostly significantly, authority, between state and traditional rulers in a single office.

Religion, the government and traditional institutions tend to converge, privileging access to power for dominant groups. There is undeniably a link between social mistrust and poor governance. Indeed, many respondents traced social mistrust and intercommunal violence to political corruption as a root cause. As one religious leader said in our interview, "whosoever is corrupt, they will hide behind their religion."

2. Social Dynamics before and after the Crisis: Minorities, Mistrust and Concentrations of Power

A major finding of this report is that in both states there exists deep social mistrust that predates the Boko Haram crisis. This results from a complex interaction of multiple axes of social difference, which have long histories but have also varied in salience over time. The social history of the states shows potential for cooperation as well as conflict. The Boko Haram insurgency has brought new forms of insecurity and, for some actors, new opportunities for personal benefit. The insurgency and the military response have deepened social mistrust. Mass displacement has led to new dynamics, combining existing identities in new ways. However, the impact of the insurgency on social dynamics cannot be generalised; in any specific local context, ethnic, linguistic and religious identities overlap to form different micro-level dynamics.

a. Pre-existing social divisions

A 'Checklist' for understanding micro-level conflict:

Based on our interviews, the following 'checklist of factors' offers a stylised model for making sense of these complex social divisions in both states. Key axes of social division include:

▶ Regional dynamics within Nigeria: Conflicts within Borno and Adamawa are framed in broader country-wide politics. Since the combination of two British protectorates, Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914 there has been competition and mutual suspicion between elites. The North was ruled via indirect rule, which selectively

strengthened a network of largely Islamic traditional rulers, whilst subverting and re-inventing element of the system to suit British interests. The British agreed to limit the activities of missionaries and the propagation of Christianity in the North in exchange for acquiescence. The South was governed through direct rule, and had a much longer and deeper encounter with missionaries, bringing both Christianity and Western education. The initial administrative regions saw a unified Northern region, which had 54% of the total population, and the south split into the Yoruba Western region and Igbo Eastern Region.

▶ Dominant / subordinate class dynamics: The slave trade and slave-raiding are important parts of the northeast's economic history, leaving a legacy of division between groups identified with master and slave roles. Historically Borno was a class based society with a rigid structure of power relations distinguishing aristocratic ruling families from an impoverished servant class. Similarly, when Adamawa was part of the Sokoto Empire, the dominant Fulani were slave-owners.

▶ Indigene / Settler: Local conflicts often concern those who believe themselves to be the 'original' inhabitants of an area versus more recently arrived 'settlers'. In the Nigerian context, all Nigerians have a constitutional right to reside anywhere in the country but state-level legislation and practice universally favours those who can prove they are 'indigenes' of the state. This dynamic also plays out at the level of ward and local government. Often candidates for Local Government Chairman must be drawn from indigenes of the local government. 'Settler' communities may live for generations in a place whilst facing exclusion from political voice[8].

▶ Christian / Muslim (discussed in more detail below)

▶ Farmer / Pastoralist: Pastoralists are livestock-rearers who travel long distances across shifting, but pre-planned transhumance routes to find water and pasture for their livestock in response to climatic conditions. They come into conflict with settled agriculturalists when they cross farmer's fields destroying crops. Pastoralists in Borno and Adamawa describe a broad range of livestock rearers, ranging from fully nomadic groups, to groups who practices transhumance seasonally and combined it with sedentary agriculture. They include both Shuwa Arabs and also Fulani herdsmen. The Shuwa Arabs are the second largest ethnic group in Borno state and are very marginalised, both in terms of representation in government and, reportedly, in the receipt of food aid. After forming a vigilante (*Khesh-khesh*) early on in the insurgency to fight against Boko Haram, they were subsequent targeted by the militants for especially punitive attacks.

These identities are neither natural facts of life nor fixed over time. They are shaped by various dynamics of modern statehood – such as the changing Nigerian constitution, economic profile and political innovation – as well as historical interventions from outside. Colonialism, by both British and Germans, has had a profound and lasting impact on how social diversity is constructed and rendered politically important.

Borno

The state-level context can be sketched as follows. In Borno the Kanuri ethnic groups are historically politically dominant, with long-standing claims that they have the right to rule. As slave-owners the Kanuri developed a reputation as the dominant group in Borno society, with the British vesting the traditional leader of the Kanuri, the Shehu, with control over much of

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[8] Aderemi Suleiman Ajala, "Identity and Space in Ibadan Politics, Western Nigeria," *African Identities* 6, no. 2 (May 2008): 149–68, doi:10.1080/14725840801933965.

the state. Especially with the passing of the Land Use Decree in 1978 which vested ownership of land in the state, Kanuri elites increasingly believed that to maintain their position as a ruling class they would have to control the formal state machinery. This has led to the rise of Kanuri ethno-nationalism.

Kanuri culture is deeply intertwined with Islam. Over time a sense of hierarchy has developed whereby Kanuri valorise their own cultural interpretation of Islam over other Nigerian forms of Islam; first Hausa and then Yoruba. Therefore, an ethnic identity, embodied in both traditional and formal political structures is mapped onto religious identity but not one-for-one. Consequently, it is popularly seen as unacceptable for Christians to rule Borno, not only for religious reasons, but because Christians cannot be Kanuri. Moreover, the idea that Borno is simply an arena of religious conflict ignores the comparative exclusion of Muslim ethnic minorities from political power.

Historically one way of dealing with minorities has been to 'zone' certain offices to certain parts of the state, or specific LGAs. The informal convention in Borno is that the Governor be a Kanuri from Central or Northern Borno, whilst the Deputy Governor be from Southern Borno, simultaneously institutionalises both inclusion and hierarchy. Non-Kanuri are guaranteed a role in power but in an explicitly contained and limited way. Indeed, this convention is contested by Southerners.

This state-level dominance is complicated by the fact that the Kanuri population face marginalisation at the regional level as a 'large minority' within the North which is otherwise Hausa-Fulani dominated. Moreover, the Kanuri have the worst indicators in Nigeria for literacy and poverty. This quick sketch, whilst inevitably reductive, captures the complexity of how inequality along different social divisions can be reinforce and counteract each other.

Adamawa

A snapshot of Adamawa shows how similar factors are expressed in a different combination. Adamawa is perhaps the most ethnically diverse states in Nigeria, with an estimated 71 ethnic groups. Fulani are over-represented in the political class and are seen as the dominant ethnic group. However, in contrast to the Kanuri in Borno, the Fulani in Adamawa are not a demographic majority[9]. Whilst Adamawa as a whole is religiously diverse, Fulani are invariably Muslim. This means that state power is seen as concentrated in Muslim hands.

Yet, due to the low geographic concentration of Fulani, there are no local government areas where Fulani make up the majority, so the ethnic and religious colouration of political power at the state level is different to that of local government.

The Adamawa case deviates from national politics, where Hausa-Fulani are treated as a unitary category, whereas in Adamawa Hausa are distinct from, and not accessing the same advantages accruing to, Fulani. Conflicts over grazing rights between pastoralists and farmers fit uncomfortably into this political context. Some people we interviewed felt that Fulani pastoralists enjoyed impunity because they were part of a dominant group, yet the paucity of government policy to genuinely improve the sustainable well-being of pastoralists means that they remain marginalised.

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[9] Data on demographics is hard to find and contested, but respondents estimated that Fulani are around 10-20% of the population.

The 'checklist model' shows how it is hard to generalise across either states or the region; those working in Borno and Adamawa must take the time to analyse the micro-level contexts of each area where they work. Prior to the Boko Haram insurgency, there was deep-seated animosity especially in areas such as Michika, Madagali and Mubi. Only then will donors be able to avoid doing harm and inflaming or exacerbating tensions. Well-designed development programmes provide ways to overcome and heal these divisions, by uniting coalitions of actors around positive developmental improvements.

Grievances and Discrimination

Our interviews provide evidence that people in both Borno and Adamawa fear discrimination in jobs, political representation and government provision of public services and security. Examples include a Christian from a minority ethnic group in Adamawa who felt that Fulani's in their work place enjoyed systematic advantages like being allocated desirable shift patterns. A mixed group of Christian and Muslim youth, from minority ethnic groups explained that they had lost out on being prefects at their school because they were not Kanuri. However grievances about discrimination and favouritism are rarely expressed in these everyday contexts. Indeed, in interviews these subjects were discussed with hushed voices and euphemistic language. This reinforces findings from previous research that there is little opportunity for open discussion of sensitive topics such as the local drivers of conflict. Describing attempts to discuss social mistrust in focus groups in Borno in 2011, Kabir and Allamin note that "most people regarded it as a no-go area and rarely discussed it in the open", what forums did exist were "cosmetic and ineffective" [10].

Where grievances did find expression was in more crude claims about Muslim domination at the level of political appointments or head-line government jobs, such as the religious balance of professors at the local poly-technic. In its most extreme forms this manifests as a belief, articulated by one Christian leader, that Muslim's in positions of authority are all committed to an agenda of Islamic imperialism and are incapable of acting in the interests of their Christian constituents. However, this sort of extreme position is rare. One possible explanation is that the un-addressed experience of small-scale everyday discrimination, feeds sympathy for more antagonistic and broad-brush views at the political level.

Indeed, a theme that was universal among our informants was that ethnic and religious discrimination was not seen as legitimate. Across the board people bemoaned the role of 'tribalism' and partiality in the allocation of power, opportunities and resources. The ideal situation was described as one where jobs were made on merit and resources allocated fairly on need and equity. However, when faced with a sense of exclusion or deprivation, ethnic or religious claims were made on the grounds that restorative actions were needed to 'right the balance' in their favour. Donors can respond to this by ensuring that their processes for hiring local staff and identifying local partners are transparent and open. Moreover, working through coalitions, where all relevant groups are represented at least forestalls the criticism that any particular intervention is one-sided.

In-Group Inequality and Marginalisation

Within communities there are also cross-cutting axes of inequality which will undermine the inclusiveness of programmes if not carefully addressed. Women are explicitly and

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[10] Muhammad Kabir and Hamsatu Allamin, "NSRP Mapping Conflict Prevention Actors and Initiatives in Selected States: Report for Borno and Yobe States" (Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme, December 2011), 4.

systematically excluded from many spheres of public life. They face discrimination in terms of employment, education and political voice. This discrimination is justified with reference to a mixture of religious and cultural beliefs. Generation is another major divide. Most positions of power are held by adult men over the age of 45, and seniority is a powerful principle among traditional rulers, religious leaders and among politicians. Young people, including young men and women, are largely excluded from economic opportunities and associated potential to social mobility. Youth restiveness is commonly referred to as a risk factor in social cohesion and stability. A consequence of these lines of in-group inequality and marginalisation is that social norms discourage young people or women from speaking freely in community discussions. This is a potential weakness of development planning models which rely on group discussions to generate a list of priorities. Techniques for managing the impact of inequality of these discussions can be borrowed from groups like MercyCorps, the Adamawa Peace Initiative and others. These groups have developed procedures whereby target communities are disaggregated into gender and age groups for initial discussions to build confidence and nurture those who often are shut out of public discussions. The second stage sees these groups brought together again for a carefully facilitated group discussion, where attention is paid to soliciting and reinforcing the views of women and female and male young people.

b. Internally Displaced People in a Complex Social Landscape

The Boko Haram conflict displaced millions of people within the Lake Chad Basin, sometimes multiple times. Communities were scattered and new communal arrangements configured based on shifting circumstances over the course of the conflict. Existing social structures have at times travelled, and at other been dislocated, with new lines of solidarity and conflict emerging. In addition to the social dynamics discussed so far in the report, the issue of IDPs and resettlement has brought new concerns to the fore.

The binary of IDPs living either in camps or in host communities is misleading. The ability of IDPs in big cities like Yola and Maiduguri to move between camps and other arrangements in host communities serves as a coping mechanism. As circumstances change for individuals and households – i.e. if housing becomes available or if relatives exhaust their ability to cater for them, or they face a loss of income – some moved into the camps as it provided at least minimum feeding. Camps were seen as a last resort. Major problems listed by IDPs were lack of privacy as tents were shared with multiple families, the lack of freedom to exit the camp and move around the city and deplorable toilet facilities especially for women. One IDP interviewed said, "It's like hell."

There have been disputes between the UN and NGOs and the state government about the repatriation of refugees, and the returning of IDPs to their villages. For example, the return of 20,000 refugees from Cameroon to the villages around Dikwa, where NGOs maintain strong concerns about Boko Haram presence[11]. Indeed, there was a policy, coming from the state government and Shettima himself, that all IDP camps would be closed in May 2017. However, under pressure from humanitarian NGOs who objected that this would precipitate a further disaster, he backed down. NGO staff have claimed that the state authorities hide or intentionally do not declare camps to them, hampering the efforts to deliver assistance and

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[11] "Le Nigeria face à Boko Haram : le grand bazar humanitaire de Maiduguri," *Le Monde.fr*, June 28, 2017, http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/06/28/maiduguri-le-grand-bazar-humanitaire_5152653_3212.html.

aid, and consigning IDPs to poorly run and highly militarised government camps, which they are not permitted to leave [12].

There are significant risks associated with the government 're-settling' IDPs in locations which remain unsafe. The relocation of IDPs to local government capitals like Bama and Pulka represent in effect the establishment of new, highly securitised IDPs camps that are cut off from other urban centres. This both impedes livelihoods as people fear returning to farm their land, and removes the possibility of IDPs employing established coping mechanisms[13]; such as hawking, informal assistance from relatives and begging.

Finally, IDPs and host communities in Maiduguri remain in dire need of basic food supplies. Any development programme must find ways to respond to immediate concerns for survival alongside longer-term development projects. This may require amending programme design, or collaborating with humanitarian actors.

3. Inter-faith activities in a climate of mistrust

Religion, Politics and Conflict

Maiduguri and Adamawa have since the 1960s had a reputation for religious tolerance with only occasional incidents of religious violence in Borno. Following democratisation in 1999 there was political mobilisation to introduce Sharia law across the North, championed in Borno by Ali Modu Sheriff. However it is popularly seen as "stage-managed" resulting in "political sharia" which has served to maintain the privileges of corrupt politicians and not benefit the common man (NRN 2011, 26). In 2006 there were violent riots over the Danish cartoons controversy and led to the burning of 33 churches. The political response to the 2006 crisis worsened inter-religious relations. Governor at the time, Ali Modu Sheriff, was accused by Christians of not having done enough. There was a deterioration in the religious and political environment following the 2006 crisis. There were efforts by coalitions of more liberal Sheikhs – such as Sheikh Ibrahim Saleh and Sheikh Abba Haji from Maiduguri and Sheikh Jafar – along with international organisations like GIZ and the GEPARDeC based at the University of Maiduguri, to counter extremist narratives.

However, the case of Boko Haram cannot be understood as simply "a clash of civilisations" between Christianity and Islam. Debates in Borno over Boko Haram reflect disagreements within Islam as much as between religions. There has been much debate over how the Boko Haram insurgency has connected to existing inter- and intra-religious conflicts. Some basics are worth noting. Firstly, Boko Haram is driven by an extreme Islamist ideology that sees Islam as under threat both from external Westernising influences and from internal misinterpretations of Islam. This has been refuted in the case of Boko Haram, on the grounds that it is best understood as a response to local and regional governmental failure, and that the majority of causalities of Boko Haram have been Muslim, including high profile clerics. However, it is also important to recognise that violence targeted against Christians has been an unavoidable component throughout the Boko Haram insurgency.

Moreover, explanations which simply rely on poverty and deprivation are too deterministic. They are unable to explain why violent extremism emerges in one poor place and not another, or at one time and not another. In terms of religious tension Boko Haram violence

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[12] Ibid.
[13] Private communication researcher Dr Adam Higazi 31st July 2017, and private communication with humanitarian workers, Maiduguri 28th July 2017.

played out in different ways depending on the micro-level context. In some places with pre-existing tensions news of Boko Haram killings was interpreted through a religious lens and inflamed local tensions between Muslims and Christians. In other locations, the threat of Boko Haram brought communities together to face a joint threat.

Religion and International Partnerships

Religion in the north-east has always been associated with international links and the flow of ideas across national borders. Islam was brought to the region across the Sahara, and Christian brought by Danish and German missionaries. These connections have evolved over time, and bring with them new opportunities as well as new tensions. From the 1980s onwards links with America brought new forms of Christian worship, with more Pentecostal emphasis on the holy spirit and miracles. This is an ongoing source of disagreement with more orthodox churches, as well are leading to blending of religious practices within churches.

Islam has also been shaped by its international links. Sufi brotherhoods extend across West Africa. In the run-up to the Boko Haram crisis sheikhs with links to Saudi Arabian conservative Islam became increasingly influential in public discourse. Boko Haram itself has claimed various, at times contradictory, international links and allegiances, most famously declaring the Caliphate of Gwoza part of Isis's international Islamic state.

This history of international intervention and support to new religious groups means that international actors must be vigilant against being seen to come with religious baggage. Western donors in particular must manage the perception that they are coming with a secret agenda of spreading Christianity. Interviewees spoke about incidents where relief items bearing religious symbols were distributed in Muslim areas, necessitating intervention by traditional rulers to ask the group to leave.

4. Politics of Recovery: State, Civil Society and International Donors

Government and Civil Society Relationship:

Donor programmes have sought to increase the capacity of civil society to play various roles in strengthening governance; whether service delivery, advocacy or scrutinising government. This final role, whereby civil society acts as a watch-dog of the state is rarely in evidence in Borno and Adamawa. It requires in a balanced relationship between government and civil society, with critical but constructive engagement. More often the relationship between civil society and the state tends towards two extremes, either civil society is docile and co-opted by the state, or it is marginalised and excluded. Efforts to carve out an intermediary position will require sensitivity and trust-building.

The previous mappings agree that the there is an absence of trust and communication both among civil society or community organisations, and between these non-state actors and the state. The picture is one of a fractured and atomised communal landscape. Many organisations that do exist are recent "grant-driven" creations, targeted at chasing donor

funding from the influx of INGOs. Among these NGOs the focus is short term, basic humanitarian relief.[14]

Most civil society groups – whether traders associations, churches, community based organisations – reported experiences approaching government at the local level with requests for assistance. Most of these requests were ignored. One FBO which repeatedly sought assistance with protecting their buildings from flooding concluded that "it is the government who is supposed to do it but we have to do it by ourselves." Faced with being ignored, or requests to pay before any work is done, most civil society groups we encountered viewed the local government with resignation, and had stopped even trying to approach them.

Similarly, previous mappings point to a lack of institutionalised and transparent channels for participation in governance.[15] For instance, whilst the state budget document is technically available to the public, it is not free of charge, and its distribution is highly monitored by the government. The Partnership to Engage, Reform and Learn (PERL) notes that there is little space for CBOs or NGOs to feed into budget processes, nor, conversely for them to gather information on citizens needs and views.

Accountability or scrutiny does sometimes happen quietly through informal channels, linking elites to key political figures. But this must be conducted tactfully, in ways that do not challenge the authority of the government officials and access is dependent on privileged social networks. Indeed, where civil society groups were successful in making demands on government it is through patrimonial connections, such as organisations having some of "their people" in the civil service or entering into clientelist relationships with politicians. PERL reports that during election campaigns ordinary citizens are nonetheless "indirectly involved" in accessing government via political representatives, giving a temporary platform to make claims on candidates. [16]

Politics of the recovery in Borno:

A key part of the picture in Borno state is the 'triple R' agency: the state Ministry for Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (MRRR). This is a state body, recently created by the Governor, and headed by Prof. Babagana who is very well placed and with strong central power. Shettima will be looking to groom a successor who can continue his influence in the state (and the APC landslide means that an APC victory is all but assured). MRRR is a high profile agency, with access to huge funds and constant engagement with international actors so serves as a valuable stepping stone to gubernatorial office. Due to MRRR's position on the frontline of a high-profile reconstruction effort, and yet outside of the usual civil service infrastructure means it wields considerable control with fewer constraints of Civil Service Ministries. International organisations are obliged to work through the MRRR, which has the power to block projects that threaten its monopoly over information.

The crisis has had knock-on effects on the relationship between government and representative local civil society, both positive and negative. Between the NSRP research in 2011 and INGO Forum's survey of local actors in 2016, there was an improvement in the relationship between the state government and NGOs in both Borno and Adamawa state.

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[14] PERL, "Borno State Rapid Assessment of Civil Society, Media and State House of Assembly Engagement in Governance Processes" (DFID: PERL, November 2016), 8.
[15] Ibid., 5.
[16] Ibid., 5–6.

They report that the state governments have been "increasingly accepting" of local NGOs involvement in relief efforts, and will consult with NGOs via sectoral working groups. This improvement is largely down to the necessity, as the government relies on civil society as "critical entry facilitators" for humanitarian work[17].

However a negative effect of the ongoing crisis has been civil society groups self-censoring for the sake of stability and calm. Any activity that might draw a crowd or lead to big gatherings of people is seen as a potential security threat, meaning unions have avoided protests or strikes. This is compounded by a belief that security agencies will be jumpy and more likely to respond to protests with violence. Moreover, criticism of government at the current time was described by one participant as "sensitive" or "would be interpreted in the wrong direction". As a result unions have de facto lost a lot of their freedom to operate. This is important for international donors to bear in mind when building capacity among civil society to play a watch-dog role: the space for challenging or criticising government is even more restricted in the shadow of security concerns than normal.

Similarly, the crisis has created new dynamics of dependency from the press to the state government. Some newspaper reporters have returned but they are housed in a special centre which the Governor has created and he is the one to guarantee their security. Similarly, the Governor organises a special press bus to take them to report on his work outside of Maiduguri. This shows mechanisms through which independence is compromised that are more complex than more commonly discussed issues such as money or outright political repression. Cooperation between the media and civil society is at best "unstructured and informal".[18]

Politics of the recovery in Adamawa

The government was slow to respond to the crisis and there is less coordination of the response than in Borno and Yobe which were more directly affected. Civil society respondents report difficulties in identifying who was responsible for recovery efforts within government. Two Nigerian journalists who toured the state in 2015 were highly critical of the absence of the state from the reconstruction and relief efforts. They write: "the only missing part in the healing process is the government. The apparent government neglect that contributed to the escalation of the insurgency still exists."[19]

Public trust in the transparency of recovery efforts in Adamawa is mixed. One interviewee reported seeing federal trucks intended to deliver assistance to government IDP camps parked in front of the houses of politicians. Other reports suggest that donations from philanthropists are intercepted by the state government before they reach IDPs or have been resold in markets. The Adamawa State Emergency Management Agency was also viewed as unreliable.

Stories of acute incompetence and corruption in the military response to Boko Haram fuel suspicions that there is collaboration between government and Boko Haram. Respondents cited instances of soldiers being sent onto the battlefield with insufficient ammunition as

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[17] Garuba Stanley and Monye Chinedu, "INGO Forum Mapping of Local Actors in North-East Nigeria: Adamawa, Borno, Gombe and Yobe States - Final Report." (INGO Forum, July 2016), 25.
[18] PERL, "Borno State Rapid Assessment of Civil Society, Media and State House of Assembly Engagement in Governance Processes," 6–7.
[19] Ibanga Isine and Ogala Emmanuel, "Nigeria: Special Report - Inside Boko Haram's Routes of Death, Destruction and Humanitarian Crises," *Premium Times (Abuja)*, October 26, 2015, http://allafrica.com/stories/201510260151.html.

evidence. One case that was repeated to us from multiple respondents was that the military sent a delivery of four armoured trucks from Yola to Mubi barracks on the eve of Boko Haram's takeover of Mubi town. This was described as proof that the army was arming Boko Haram.

A further concern locally is that the state government is using its control of assistance to penalise areas that voted for the opposition in 2015. Indeed, Madagali and Michika, the worst affected LGAs in Adamawa voted against the APC both in the presidential and gubernatorial elections. Other areas affected by Boko Haram, such as Song and Hong, voted against the APC in one or both the elections. Another respondent said they felt that reconstruction in the north of the state had been done on the basis of political priorities rather than need, with some rebuilding of schools in communities that were not directly affected by the conflict. Without more research it is impossible to say whether these claims have any foundation, but it reflects a lack of trust in government to provide services on an impartial basis.

International NGOs and public mistrust

There are estimated to be over 300 donor activities ongoing in Borno State (as of February 2017). PERL characterise the current situation regarding the reconstruction and relief efforts as "very difficult and confusing", with Maiduguri was recently described as "a humanitarian bazaar".[20] In Borno, there have occasionally been strained relations between the state governor and INGOs, with him questioning their usefulness in the state. Shettima is said to view the interventions of INGOs as "an infringement of its sovereignty" and has been accused of strategically minimizing the scale of the disaster and thus the need for a coordinated internationally-supported response.[21] The Governor's criticism of international NGOs operating in Borno should be taken seriously because it reflects broad-based public suspicions in Borno and Adamawa. Issues include high operating overheads, especially visible signs like expensive SUVs and setting up offices in newly-built, luxurious compounds. One indicative example cited by informants in northern Adamawa was the case of a foreign NGO driving to a poor village in a convoy of high-end SUVs and building only a very simple zinc toilet block. This example captures the security imperatives faced by foreign humanitarian workers in what are still conflict zones, and juxtaposes these costly but very normalised everyday measures with the desire from donors that interventions be value for money and locally sourced.

Beyond concerns simply about waste, there is also a popular belief that some INGOs are collaborating or at the very least communicating with Boko Haram. Evidence cited to support this belief is the news that donor medicines were found in abandoned Boko Haram camps, and the involvement of groups like the IRC in the negotiations that resulted in the return of the Chibok school girls. A recurring theme in our interviews with more educated leaders was the invocation of conspiracy theories to explain social malaise. Their accounts of Nigeria's problems mixed elements of well proven international corruption, such as Abacha's siphoning of funds to banks in Switzerland, to more farfetched claims, such as that the American government was involved in arming Boko Haram, and then to more well-trodden tropes of global conspiracy theories, such as the hidden power of the Rothschild bank. Beyond the questionable specific claims made, these theories reflect a well-founded concern that ordinary Nigerians in the north-east are suffering due to unknown and international forces, which extend beyond the bounds of local or state politics, which at least are familiar

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[20] "Le Nigeria face à Boko Haram."
[21] Ibid.

and easy to decode. The role of the State Government in perpetuating these suspicions is to some extent cynical; at the same time as capitalising on popular suspicions of wasteful INGOs it is itself responsible for the gifting of prime offices to INGOs and hosting them with sizeable government entourages.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this report has analysed the complex landscape of key social and political actors in Borno and northern Adamawa. Axes of social mistrust which were salient before the Boko Haram insurgency have in many cases been exacerbated by the crisis. Massive displacement has further complicated social dynamics, whilst provoking an impressive demonstration of solidarity by ordinary people, civil society groups and religious organisations across the region. Donors who seek to engage in the recovery process should pay close attention to how social divisions have played out in the local contexts they work in, and build inclusive coalitions to avoid doing harm. There will inevitably be tensions between working through existing gatekeepers who represent existing power hierarchies and facilitating the social transformation needed to set the northeast on a path away from persistent conflict and towards equitable development. International aid and development organisations are inescapably intertwined in this complex social and political environment. Actors coming from the international sphere must be sensitive to the historical baggage they bring, and think about their impact beyond simply their intended programmes. This includes their effect on the rental market in places like Maiduguri, the ways that their presence may be strategically manipulated by powerful actors, and unintentional connections they may have with legacies of colonialism and religious proselytization. The need for improved governance in northeast Nigeria is undeniable. So long as international organisations engage sensitively with various political and social actors, and centre their work on local expertise and experience, then they can be effective partners in this important task.

Annexes

Annexe 1: Traditional Leaders in Borno and Adamawa

Borno

The Shehu is traditional ruler of the Borno Emirate, home to the Kanuri people who make up the majority ethnic group in Borno state. The current Shehu is Abubakar Ibn Umar Garbai. His mandate extends officially over 16 of Borno's 27 LGAs, but is recognised by Kanuri across the region. In addition, there are another six Emirate Councils (Dikwa, Biu, Askira, Gwoza, Shani and Uba Emirates) which advise local governments on cultural and traditional matters. The Borno Emirate was formed by the French colonists at the beginning of the 20th century, but is headed by descendants of the much older Borno Empire, dating back over 1000 years. The currently existing system of Kanuri traditional titles is a co-creation of the British colonial officials and pre-existing customs.

The Shehu does not own land, but relies on income from the state government and donations. The Shehu has at times played a key role in conflict prevention and resolution, albeit by urging police to shoot violent rioters in 2000. Commentators linked the escalation of violence around the Danish cartoons and Obasanjo's proposed third term, to the Shehu's absence from the state at the time. Garbai (b.1957) has been in office since February 2009. He has worked in local and state government, including as Permanent Secretary in several ministries.

Adamawa

The supreme traditional ruler in Adamawa is the Lamido of Adamawa, who resides at the Lamido Palace in Yola. The Lamido also serves as Chairman of Adamawa State Traditional Rulers Council. The current Lamido, Dr Barkindo Musdafa, has a diploma in law and has studied in the UK. Following in his father's footsteps, he assumed office in 2010 after a career first in the public sector and then in engineering. There are three ruling houses of the Adamawa Emirate: Yelwa, Sanda and Toungo.

Annexe 2: Religious Groups

Islamic groups

Sufi Brotherhoods - Tijjaniya

Both states are officially Sunni, under the Mazhab of Imam Malik. Sufi brotherhoods dominate[22]. Historically the two Sufi brotherhoods or *turuk* (Tijjaniya and Qadiriyya) were peaceful and non-confrontational in their orientation towards both the state and public religious life. The Tijjaniya are split between pre-reform and reformist groups. The Pre-reform Sufi practice a more discrete, less public form of religious observance and intentionally distance themselves from the state. For example, pre-reform Tijjaniya typically will not accept funds from government and do not recognise the pronouncements of Emirs and Sultans. Reform Sufism is linked to Senegal and the teachings of Sheikh Nyass of Kaolack new line network of zawiyas (religious centres) in Borno[23].

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[22] Muhammad Nur Alkali, Abubakar Kawu Monguno, and Ballama Shettima Mustafa, "Overview of Islamic Actors in Northeastern Nigeria," NRN Working Paper (Oxford: Nigeria Research Network, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, January 2012), 10.
[23] Ibid., 6.

Izala / JIBWIS

The Izala, also known as JIBWIS[24], are a more recent and radical Islamic group[25]. It is "a fundamentalist Sunni Islamic movement that separated from the Sufi establishment in the 1950s-70s[26]. Izala is a Salafi-inspired reformist group that is heavily influenced by the Wahhabi doctrines from Saudi Arabia." [27] They argue for the elimination of religious innovation and seek to restore exclusively the practices of the Qur'an and the Sunna period, claiming a more orthodox position. The Izala split in 1990 over support of first Gulf war and Saddam Hussein the two factions and now known as the Saddam faction and the Bush faction. Izala is more popular among the Hausa than the majority Kanuri as they have been resisted by the ulema (religious Islamic elites) in Borno, where it is seen as oversimplifying Islam[28]. Whilst the Izala are not the dominant grouping, they are nonetheless estimated to be present in all states and LGAs[29].

"Neutral Muslims" and Influential Sheikhs

Some mappings of religious actors in the north of Nigeria have included a category of 'neutral Muslims' who are not affiliated with any sect. Estimates place this group at anywhere from 10% upwards [30]. Any sort of calculation of religious demographics in the north-east is fraught with difficulty. What is clear however, is that most of Muslims in the north-east identify primarily as Muslim[31] rather than embracing sect-specific identities. The descriptions above of differences within Sufi-ism and Sunni Islam should therefore not be overstated. Affiliation is more likely to be to a favoured mosque or sheikh. Some individual sheikhs - Islamic scholars – are highly influential, both in questions of religion and politics, and have sizeable personal followings. High profile figures travel between mosques to give sermons. Ramadan is the key time for sheikhs to speak publicly, with mosques organising a programme of nightly lectures. Indeed, the origins of Boko Haram are in Mohammad Yusuf's individual following.

Al-Majirai

Maiduguri, the state capital of Borno, is a centre for Islamic education and it draws young boys from across the region to be students of Malams in the city. These boys are known as al-majirai, and whilst studying rely on charitable donations of food for their survival.

Other Islamic Groups

The Shia are outside of the normal mainstream of Islam in Borno and Adamawa States period but there are some key Shia religious and social players such as El-Zakzaky. Recently tensions between the Shia and the Nigerian army have flared elsewhere in the North. In December 2015 the Nigerian Army raided El-Zakzaky's compound in Zaria, Kaduna state, killing hundreds of his followers and detaining him for over a year[32].

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[24] Jama'atu Izalatul Bid'a wa Ikamatu Sunna
[25] Alkali, Monguno, and Mustafa, "Overview of Islamic Actors in Northeastern Nigeria," 12.
[26] 24YOL317
[27] HART, "'Some Will Die, but We Will Not All Die. Those That Can Carry on Must Keep Hope Alive.' North Nigeria Visit Report: 30th Nov - 7th Dec 2015" (Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust, 2015), 9.
[28] Alkali, Monguno, and Mustafa, "Overview of Islamic Actors in Northeastern Nigeria," 18.
[29] Ibid., 13.
[30] Ibid.
[31] 2MAID257
[32] Alkali, Monguno, and Mustafa, "Overview of Islamic Actors in Northeastern Nigeria," 13.

Finally, there are some groups of Yoruba Muslims from the South West of Nigeria, who have over decades established specifically Yoruba Islamic institutions, notably the Ansurudeen which runs a number of well-respected schools in Maiduguri[33].

Christian Groups

EYN

EYN (*Ekklesiyar Yan'uwa a Nigeria*) is a Protestant church, founded with missionary support in Adamawa state in 1923. It has historical connections with the US-base Church of Brethren, of which it is an autonomous member, and the Basel Mission. EYN run a variety of social programmes and numerous nurseries and primary schools. The EYN Disaster Committee manages their programme of services to IDPs, including an EYN IDP camp on the outskirts of Yola with a capacity of 260 (soon to be doubled). Their HIV-AIDS project is ranked by INGO Forum as having above average capacity. It has a presence across Adamawa and has been active in Maiduguri since 1979[34].

Lutheran Church of Christ in Nigeria

The Lutheran Church of Christ of Nigeria (LCCN) was originally established as a Lutheran denomination in 1913 by missionaries from Sudan United Mission – Danish Branch, changing its name in 1956. Since 1961 it has been a member of the Lutheran World Federation. Their headquarters is in Numan and they have seven dioceses across Adamawa. Their social services wing was rated by INGO Forum as having fairly average capacity for humanitarian programmes. Archbishop Musa Panti Filibus, head of LCCN, was elected head of the Lutheran World Federation in May 2017.

ECWA

ECWA (Evangelical Church Winning All) originated as part of the Sudan Interior Mission, and its Nigerian branches came together to form an indigenous church in 1954. It claims a membership of 5 million in Nigeria and has branches in the USA and the UK. Headquartered in Jos, ECWA runs a network of hospitals and seminaries across Northern Nigeria.

Pentecostal Churches

Pentecostal churches in Borno and Adamawa include a wide variety of individual churches and networks. Huge international churches like Redeemed Christian Church of God, Deeper Life Bible Ministry and Living Faith (also known as Winners Chapel) have a presence, as well as smaller groups including 'man and wife' churches with just one or two branches. Pentecostal churches include: Grace and Light International Ministry (Adamawa and Biu), New Life Gospel Centre (Adamawa), and Upper Room Cathedral.

Annexe 3: Umbrella and Interfaith Groups

JNI – Jama'atu Nasril Islam

JNI is "a quasi-official actor being largely controlled by the traditional rulers" (NRN 2012, 21). It was set up in Kaduna just before independence, as part of efforts to unite the North[35] behind a shared Muslim identity. JNI was the public voice of Muslims through the 1960-70s, but now faces stronger competition from alternative forms of Islamic organisation. It operates across the whole of Northern Nigeria with its North-East regional office in Maiduguri.

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[33] Ibid., 16.
[34] *Ekklesiyar Yan'uwa a Nigeria*
[35] 24YOL317

Muslim Councils

Muslim councils were set up to defend Muslim interests broadly conceived and to develop unity over issues of observance that have historically divided Muslims in the North East. For example, the start and the end dates of the Ramadan period of fasting. A Nigeria Research Network working paper in 2012 describes the Muslim councils as "an important player in the region".

In Adamawa the Muslim Council was established in 1986 by the Lamido with the dual aim of uniting different Muslim sects and improving relations with Christians[36]. It brings together 25 Muslim organisations, and includes the main sects: both the Sufi *turuks/darikas* and the Izala. Shia groups are not formal members but many Shia individuals are members via groups such as the Muslim Students Society or aid groups. It is very strong and credited with averting a Christian/Muslim religious crisis in 2003 in Numan, over the relocation of the mosque. (NRN 2011) News reports from Jan 2015 describe the Muslim Council as working closely with the API. A key link was Imam Dauda Bello who was State Secretary of the MCA at the time[37].

CAN – Christian Association of Nigeria

The Christian Association of Nigeria is the primary national association representing all Christians in Nigeria. Its membership includes pastors and clergy divided in five blocs representing the main denominational groups and the members elect a central executive board. Each of the five blocs has sub-associations which operate independently. The five blocks are: 1. TEKAN[38] (EYN and LCCN) and ECWA, 2. Catholic Bishops Conference of Nigeria 3. Protestant (Christian Council of Nigeria) 4. Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria and 5. Organisation of African Instituted Churches. CAN at the state level replicates the national structure of five blocks and an elected executive, with CAN coordinators in every local government.

NIREC - National Inter-Religious Council

Set up in 2000 by the Obasanjo administration, it is sponsored by the federal government and has branches in every state. At a national level the council is co-chaired by the Sultan of Sokoto and the president of CAN and is constituted by equal numbers of Muslim and Christian representatives. NIREC is active in Adamawa but not Borno and comes under the leadership of traditional institutions (NRN 2011, 19). It is similar mode of operation to API and others with joint visits to conflict flashpoints. It aims to improve the relationships between different religions in Nigeria. It organises joint conferences and workshops[39].

Inter-faith Mediation Council

This is a donor driven inter-faith initiative that has at least on paper a well-defined organogram of state and local level structures. It brings together Christian and Muslim leadership in both Borno and Adamawa. There is a network of trained peace activists across various LGAs. It conducts its trainings mostly in English and tends to reach a demographic of relatively more educated people.

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[36] 24YOL317
[37] http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/196125-idps-pray-for-indimi-dangote-atiku-at-adamawas-food-distribution-centres.html
[38] *Tarayyar Ekklisiyar Kristi a Nigeria*, Fellowship of Churches of Christ in Nigeria
[39] 24YOL317

API

From reviewing the literature in advance of the mission, the Adamawa Peace Initiative was identified as a major player in the relief and recovery efforts in Adamawa. Run out of the AUN it succeeded in building an inclusive inter-faith coalition to deliver aid through various local partners, partly funded by USAID and partly funded by local philanthropists. Significant funding comes from three prominent Nigerian philanthropists: Mohammed Indimi, Aliko Dangote, and Atiku Abubakar.

However, our analysis found that much of the information about the relief and recovery was mediated via the AUN in some form. The most in-depth news reports are either press releases by AUN/API or by journalists who were hosted by AUN and largely reliant on their networks. Our research sought to contextualise the role of the API in the broader landscape of inter-faith work and its links to the Atiku-funded AUN.

Founded in 2012 by President of AUN, Margee Ensign, and Chair of the Board of Trustees of AUN, Ahmadu Joda, the Adamawa Peace Initiative was initially set up in response to unrest over the removal of the oil subsidy. It was feared that, due to widespread social mistrust, protests that started as anti-government could degenerate into conflict along ethnic or religious lines. Ensign and Joda invited religious, community, market and ethnic leaders who became the API's founding members. Among these founding members were: Bishop Peter Makanto of Upper Room Chapel, a Pentecostal church, and Steven Ransom. All were based in Yola.

Early on, their focus was on going to flashpoints of conflict, such as Michika town and doing peace-building work with the local leaders. They launched a number of programmes funded via the AUN to empower young men and women, promote social cohesion and reduce the push factors that made young people vulnerable to recruitment by Boko Haram. These include sports programmes, ICT training, income-generating recycling projects and basic education.

In 2013, IDP started arriving in Yola fleeing Boko Haram in Southern Borno and Northern Adamawa. Estimates range from 400,000 to 545,000 IDPs in Yola at the peak of the crisis. The API's initial foray into humanitarian relief was to provide women's toilets in the camps. Facing reluctance on the part of the government to let other agencies operate in or even inspect the camps, the API turned its attention to IDPs living in the city. Like many resident of Yola, members of the API were personally hosting IDPs in their houses. The API instigated a mass registration exercise, drawing on ward heads from the traditional ruler system, and partner organisations, like the MCA, CAN and women's groups to screen and register IDPs in their networks. They distributed food clothing and sanitary items.

The API reached over a quarter of a million people. According to the AUN's literature, the programme fed 300,000 people for 18 months in the context of widespread government and donor neglect. However, this figure and the apparent expansive nature of its networks of civil society partners belies the API's modest organisational structure. The API has no central office, but is run from the voluntary efforts of its members out of their private offices. Moreover, whilst its ability to harness connections with other groups at key points was impressive, these connections are not institutionalised or regular, with cooperation often being sporadic.

Going forward, the API's future is uncertain; both as the situation regarding IDPs in Yola changes and its founder Margee Ensign has left the AUN. As the need for humanitarian relief

in Adamawa evolves into longer term needs for development and peace-building, the API has expertise, experience and commitment which make it a strong candidate for capacity building with donors. Key members have already received capacity building training funded by state-level elites, such as in peace-building and mediation which has strengthened their activities.

A lesson can be drawn from API's experience of coalition building in Adamawa. Originally there was tension between the API and CAN, as the API worked closely with individual Christian leaders rather than going through the central CAN hierarchy. The explanation given was that for the initiative to get off the ground they had to select partners based on whether they "shared a passion and understood what we were trying to do", rather than strictly follow protocol.

One of questions generated through the desk-based literature review was whether the API's relationship with the AUN and thus Abubakar Atiku influenced its operations. This was a sensitive subject for our respondents, but from the interviews conducted it seems that Atiku's role was largely limited to monetary contributions. Like other AUN charitable programmes the API is funded by a mixture of American and Irish government funds and personal donations from Atiku. He provided the bulk of the funds for the API feeding programme. API organisers say they were told that "anytime they needed anything they could call on him". Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that Atiku's influence led the Governor show an interest in the API, bringing him to visit some of their programmes.

The AUN and its charitable efforts like the API should be understood as one part of Atiku's broader political portfolio, but that does not mean that the initiative is politicised per se. Atiku is fantastically wealthy and is widely believed to have political aspirations to the presidency and increased national influence. Yet, he is unpopular in his own state, seen as having little local followership and changing allegiances too easily. The AUN and related projects are interpreted by many as part of broader efforts to improve his public image in response to sustained negative rumours and press coverage dating back to his falling out with Obasanjo when Atiku was Vice-President. His wealth is seen by many as suspect; for instance, interviewees questioned how he was so wealthy whilst not being from a rich family, with many linking it to corruption when he was Comptroller General and in charge of customs receipts. Generally, those spoken to for this research regarded the AUN and API as good uses of possibly ill-gotten funds, and a legitimate way of a politician easing their conscience and laundering their public image.

Annexe 4: Index of Interviews

Interview code	Date	Role	Location	State / town
1ABV217	21/07/2017	Civil Society Activist from Borno	GIZ Office	Abuja
2MAID257	25/07/2017	INGO Staff	Government Lodge	Maiduguri
3MAID257	25/07/2017	Christian Leader, Maiduguri	GIZ Office, Maiduguri	Maiduguri
4MAID257	25/07/2017	Traditional Ruler, Senior Civil Servant and Civil Society Activist in Maiduguri	His Office, State Secretariat	Maiduguri
5MAID257	25/07/2017	Christian leader in Borno	CAN Secretariat	Maiduguri
6MAID257	25/07/2017	INGO Staff Maiduguri	IMC Borno State Office	Maiduguri
7MAID267	26/07/2017	Islamic Leader, Maiduguri	IMIC, Director's office	Maiduguri
8MAID267	26/07/2017	Bulama - community level traditional leader - Maiduguri	Outside Bulama's residence	Maiduguri
9MAID267	26/07/2017	Pastoralist leader, Maiduguri	His Office	Maiduguri
10MAID267	26/07/2017	International Staff of INGO	Mercy Corps Offices	Maiduguri
11MAID267	26/07/2017	Displaced women in Maiduguri	Private Residence, Forestry Quarters	Maiduguri
12MAID277	27/07/2017	Youth Focus Group	GIZ Office	Maiduguri
13MAID277	27/07/2017	Municipal civil servant, Maiduguri	GIZ Office	Maiduguri
14MAID277	27/07/2017	Sales manager, supermarket, Maiduguri	Shop Floor, Central Maiduguri	Maiduguri
15MAID277	27/07/2017	Provisions seller in Maiduguri	Private shop, Giwa Barrack area	Maiduguri
16YOL287	28/07/2017	Former Politician and Philanthropist	Private Offices	Yola
17YOL287	28/07/2017	1) Islamic Leader 2) IDP	Islamic Education Trust Office	Yola
18YOL297	29/07/2017	Christian leader in Adamawa	Private Residence	Yola
19YOL297	29/07/2017	Christian camp organiser in Yola and IDPs	Non-governmental IDP Camp, Yola	Yola
20YOL297	29/07/2017	Muslim Leaders in Yola	JIBWIS Office	Yola
21YOL307	30/07/2017	Christian Leader in Yola	Pastor's Office, Jimeta	Yola
22YOL307	30/07/2017	NGO Staff based in Yola	AUN Club	Yola
23YOL307	30/07/2017	Civil Society Activist and Academic in Yola	AUN Hotel Lobby	Yola
24YOL317	31/07/2017	High profile religious leader, civil society activist and academic in Yola	AUN Hotel Lobby	Yola

Interview code	Date	Role	Location	State / town
25MUB317	31/07/2017	Chairman of a market association in Mubi	Private residence	Mubi
26MUB018	01/08/2017	Traditional leader - Village Head - Mubi Area	Private residence	Mubi
27MUB018	01/08/2017	Focus Group of CSOs and Associations from Mubi South	Mubi South District Office	Mubi
28MUB018	01/08/2017	Representatives of Womens Societies and Local Government	FOMWAN, CAN, NCWS and local government official	Mubi
29MUB018	01/08/2017	Representative of transport union, Mubi	Heavy Trucks Association	Mubi
30MUB018	01/08/2017	Chairman of a transport union, Mubi	NURTW	Mubi
31MUB018	01/08/2017	Youth Representative, Mubi	Youth	Mubi
32MUB018	01/08/2017	Representative of Tailoring association in Mubi	Tailoring	Mubi
33MUB018	01/08/2017	Representative of Farmer's Association in Mubi	Farmer's Union	Mubi
34MUB018	01/08/2017	Leader of Community Development Association in Mubi	Community Development association	Mubi
35MUB018	01/08/2017	Local government Muslim leader	Muslim Council of Adamawa, Mubi South	Mubi
36MUB018	01/08/2017	Emir of Mubi	Emir's palace	Mubi
37ABV038	03/08/2017	Aide to state-level political representative	Private Office	Abuja
38ABV038	03/08/2017	Female staff of INGO who worked in Maiduguri	GIZ Office	Abuja

Summary of Interview Participants:

Location	Number of Interviews
Maiduguri, Borno State	14
Yola, Adamawa State	9
Mubi, Adamawa State	11
Abuja, Federal Capital Territory	3
TOTAL	37

Language	Number of Interview
English	21
English and Hausa	5
Kanuri	3
Hausa	8
TOTAL	37

Category	Number of Interviews
Business / Trader	6
Civil Society	13
Government	3
IDPs	2 Focus Groups
INGO	1
Religion	8
Traditional Rulers	3
Youth	1 Focus Group
TOTAL	37

Gender	Number	%
Men	45	75
Women	15	25
TOTAL	60	100

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